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1. Introduction 
 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction over interstate oil 
and gas pipelines and electricity transmission systems. A high and apparently 
increasing proportion of rate cases before it are settled by negotiation between the 
parties, rather than by litigation.  
- Between 1961 and 1970 about 56% of the natural gas pipeline rate cases at the 
predecessor to FERC, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), were settled in 
whole or in part. (Spritzer 1971) 
- As of 1980, settlements were reached in approximately two-thirds (66%) of all 
electric utility rate cases. (FERC staff 1980 per Wang 2004) 
- As of 1986, over 70% of pipeline rate cases were settled. (Walker 1986) 
- Over many recent years, “approximately 80% of the contested proceedings set 
for hearing at the Commission are settled”. (FERC 2010 p. 18) 
- During 2007-09, 90% of cases set for hearing achieved partial or complete 
consensual agreement. (FERC 2010 pp. 88-92) 
 
In the one detailed study, Wang found that 38 out of 40 section 4 rate applications 
brought by large natural gas pipelines during 1994-2000 were settled in whole or in 
part, and only 2 litigated. That is, there was settlement in whole or in part in 95% of 
these cases. In addition, the one section 5 case brought by FERC was settled.  
 
Settlement makes a dramatic difference to processing times. In 1980 FERC’s average 
processing time for general electric rate cases was 14 months for uncontested 
settlements, compared to 37 months for contested settlements and 50 months for fully 
litigated rate cases. (Wang reporting FERC Staff) These orders of magnitude still 
obtain. Wang found the average time to settle most gas pipeline rate cases during the 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Ralph Leslie and Kenneth Sosnick at FERC for patient explanation of these issues 
and for helpful data. Discussions with Richard O’Neill, Anna Cochrane, Richard Howe and Judge 
Michael Cianci (FERC), Irwin Steltzer, Linda Stuntz (Stuntz, Davis & Staffier, P.C.), Bill Hogan, 
Patricia Jagtiani and colleagues (Natural Gas Supply Association), Kelly Daly (Stinson, Morrison 
Hecker LLP), Frank Lindh (California PUC), Scott Hempling (NRRI), Kevin Huntsman (Mastio & Co) 
and many others provided further insights. Comments and suggestions of three referees have been 
helpful. I thank Ofwat for partial support to write up the early material, and the EPRG Group at 
Cambridge University for contribution towards travel expenses. 
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late 1990s was about one year, plus the time for FERC to approve them (which ranged 
from about 1 to 13 months with a median of about 3 ½ months). In contrast, one of the 
two litigated cases took about 3½ years to process, the other about 5½ years.  
 
Walker set out some procedural aspects of settlement at FERC. Rosenzweig and 
Shuttleworth (2008) briefly outline FERC’s present procedures but do not discuss how 
settlements are facilitated. There has been discussion of the legal context surrounding 
settlements, including their status and appropriateness, and in particular with respect to 
non-unanimous or contested settlements. (Drom 1991, Krieger 1995, and literature 
survey by Doucet and Littlechild 2006) Buchmann and Tongeren (1996) have drawn 
attention to the qualitative difference in the nature of negotiated outcomes compared to 
litigated outcomes. Wang has documented this with FERC cases. These authors 
attribute the different outcomes to negotiations taking the case as a whole whereas 
litigation takes each issue on a line by line basis.  
 
In the past, some jurisdictions may have discouraged settlements. Increasingly, there 
seems to be sympathy for them. However, there has been no systematic survey of the 
general picture in North America. Littlechild (2009a,b) has examined which kinds of 
cases tend to be settled or not settled in Florida (generally, rate reductions are settled 
but not rate increases), and has contrasted the outcomes with those of the litigated 
process. Doucet and Littlechild (2009) have documented the development of 
settlements at the National Energy Board (NEB) in Canada.  
 
Why are such a high proportion of cases settled at FERC? In Florida and Canada the 
parties themselves negotiate the settlements with little or no role for the regulator. It 
might be assumed that the same ‘hands-off’ approach is adopted at FERC.  
 
In fact, however, the opposite is true. FERC Trial Staff are actively involved at each 
stage of the settlement process. They present what is known as a ‘first settlement offer’ 
in response to a pipeline proposal to change rates. This is Trial Staff’s own view of 
what would be a reasonable outcome. Thereafter, Trial Staff actively seek to facilitate 
agreement between the parties, including by multilateral and bilateral discussions and 
by presenting and analysing further counter offers as necessary.  
 
This paper provides a detailed account of how the settlement process at FERC actually 
works in practice with respect to gas pipeline rate cases. (The process for dealing with 
electricity transmission systems is similar but differs in one main respect, as explained 
below.) To give some indication of the time involved at each stage of the process, the 
paper presents data from the 12 pipeline rate cases brought during fiscal years 2008 and 
2009, of which 9 were settled in full and 2 in part, and 1 was litigated.  
 
The justification for describing FERC’s active regulatory process in some detail is 
twofold. First, negotiated settlement has now become the standard process for setting 
interstate gas and electricity rates: the previously conventional litigated approach is 
essentially reserved for occasional dispute resolution (though of course its existence 
influences the content of the settlements). Among regulatory bodies, settlement is most 
pervasive at FERC - yet no account of its pro-active settlement process presently exists, 
and indeed there is no hint of it in the economic regulation literature.  
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Second, it is hoped that the account will also be of relevance in other contexts where 
changes to regulatory arrangements are under discussion and where negotiated 
settlement is essentially unknown. In the UK, for example, interest in the concept of 
settlements is tempered by a concern that some parties (particularly smaller customers) 
would thereby lose access to regulatory information, opinion, guidance and support. A 
better understanding of actual regulatory involvement at FERC should provide some 
reassurance and facilitate the improvement of regulatory arrangements there and 
elsewhere. This is not to argue, of course, that arrangements at FERC are directly 
applicable in the UK or in State jurisdictions or elsewhere. 2 
 
Apart from the process, the nature and outcome of settlements are of interest. Why do 
parties settle? What if any difference do settlements make? What kinds of cases tend to 
settle? What if anything has been the trend over time and why? The paper discusses 
what light can be shed on these and other questions by the FERC data examined here. It 
also looks at two recent trends: the pre-filing of settlements before filing rate changes 
with FERC and the settling of section 5 (rate reduction) cases brought by FERC. 
 
2. Gas industry background 
 
FERC regulates over 170 interstate natural gas pipeline systems of which 128 are large 
enough to file regular information via Forms 2 and 2A.3 In 2008 the Top 30 pipelines 
(in terms of system capacity) ranged from nearly 16,000 miles in length to under 1000 
miles and accounted for nearly three-quarters of total interstate system capacity. Two or 
three new pipelines are constructed each year. Some pipelines are small, less than 100 
miles long, often connecting to other pipelines. Others are longer: the Rockies Express 
commissioned in November 2009 was an expansion of some 1500 miles. 
 
The customers of these pipelines typically comprise i) gas producers ii) gas marketers 
iii) large end-users including power plants, and iv) local gas distribution (delivery) 
companies (LDCs) who in turn sell to smaller end-users. These parties may be at either 
end of the pipeline or at any point(s) along it. 
 
Customers wish to avoid excessive transportation rates. They may be subject to 
competition, including from other fuels. The pipeline is also subject to some degree of 
competition from other pipelines. A distribution company, particularly in a larger city, 
might be hooked up to two or more pipelines, thereby giving it a degree of choice as to 
which to use. Some larger distribution companies are hooked up to as many as seven 
                                                 
2 For example, most UK utility customers are smaller, more numerous and less-informed than 
those appearing before FERC, and UK regulatory bodies do not have separate Trial Staff, Advisory 
Staff and Administrative Law Judges. On the other hand, it goes too far to claim that the use of 
negotiated settlements “would require far-reaching reforms to British regulatory procedures (and 
laws)” and “cannot function without the transfer or introduction of several other regulatory 
institutions and legal principles” (Rosenzweig and Shuttleworth 2008), and that “regulatory 
settlements only work if the regulators have previously written down in immense detail exactly 
how they would carry out a formal regulatory review, so that everyone can predict the likely 
outcome” (Shuttleworth 2008). 
3 FERC’s three digit pipeline code lists 232 gas pipelines. Its list of regulated entities comprises 157 
gas pipelines plus 17 Gulf offshore pipelines. Some 84 Major pipelines (volume exceeding 50m 
dekatherms) presently provide quarterly and annual financial and operational information via 
Form 2, while 44 Non-Major pipelines (volume between 200k and 50m dekatherms) complete a 
simpler Form 2A. The FPC was renamed FERC in 1977. 
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pipelines. Each pipeline offers access to a number of different producers. Some 
pipelines have as many as 10,000 supply points where producers can input gas. 
 
Gas distribution companies are not subject to competition, but are subject to regulation 
by State public utility commissions. The distribution companies’ incentive to argue for 
lower rates may be limited insofar as they are typically allowed to pass the costs of 
transportation through to final customers. Moreover, if they argue for a lower allowed 
return on capital they may find that their State regulatory commissions argue for a 
comparably lower cost of capital for themselves. Similarly, some of the pipeline’s 
customers may feel that they have to ‘pull their punches’ in order to maintain a working 
relationship with the pipeline, including in acting together in promoting the industry.  
 
However, the State public utility commissions themselves typically act as intervenors 
(interested parties) in FERC cases, and in practice play a major role in the settlement 
process. They generally argue on behalf of end-customers, especially smaller ones, 
although commissions in predominantly ‘producer’ states may be less active.  
 
The number of participants in any rate case will vary, depending perhaps on the size of 
the pipeline or the size or nature of rate change proposed. Reportedly, most of the 
customers are represented in each case. Other intervenors may include rival pipelines 
and potential (as opposed to actual) customers. 
 
 
3. Section 4 and 5 rate cases 
 
A pipeline has a ‘right to rely on the rate on file’ – that is, it is entitled to charge the 
rates and provisions in the tariff determined by the most recent FERC decision. (Tariff 
provisions include quality of service obligations.) Whoever wishes to change those 
tariffs bears the burden of proof that the existing tariffs are unjust and unreasonable, 
and that proposed new tariffs would be just and reasonable.  
 
Under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act 1938, a gas pipeline has the right to file for a 
change in tariffs at any time. FERC has 30 days in which to respond. It may then 
suspend a new tariff for a maximum of five months, while it investigates and holds 
hearings. Thereafter the pipeline has the right to implement the new tariff until FERC 
makes a determination. However, FERC may order a ‘suspension subject to refund’, 
whereby such proportion of the changed revenues that is subsequently disallowed is 
refunded to customers, backdated to when the new tariffs were implemented. 
 
Under section 5 of the Act, FERC is authorized to investigate the tariffs charged by a 
pipeline, either on its own initiative or after complaint by a third party. FERC and any 
third party bear the burden of proof if they wish to change the tariffs. In the event of a 
finding that tariffs are no longer just and reasonable, FERC may not order a refund.4  
 
 
                                                 
4 This is said to give a pipeline the incentive to spin out a section 5 case (although recent section 5 
cases have been settled relatively quickly – see below). There is presently active discussion 
whether to allow refunds dating back to the time of filing a section 5 case, as is already the case in 
the electric sector, which could encourage the bringing of section 5 cases by other parties. 
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4. Order 636 and the number of rate cases 
 
Until 1992, gas pipelines not only transported gas but typically also bought and sold 
gas. Because gas purchase costs tended to fluctuate, pipelines were allowed a 
Purchased Gas Adjustment (PGA) clause that tracked gas purchase costs each 6 – 12 
months with a periodic true-up. In return for that automatic pass-through right, the 
pipelines as gas suppliers were required to make a section 4 filing of their pipeline 
transportation and storage rates every 3 years. 
 
FERC Order 636, issued on 8 April 1992, restructured the gas pipeline sector by 
requiring the unbundling (separation) of gas production, transportation and sales 
activities with a view to increasing competition among gas sellers and reducing the 
market power of pipeline companies. Once gas pipelines were no longer involved in 
gas purchase and sales they no longer had the PGA clause, hence there was no 
obligation to make a section 4 rate filing every 3 years. 
 
This had a dramatic impact on the number of rate cases. Before 1992, with about 128 
pipelines filing every three years, there would presumably have been over 40 pipeline 
rate cases per year. In contrast, on average there have been less than 7 pipeline rate 
cases per year since 1998. 5  
 
This means that, in practice, many pipelines are no longer involved in the traditional 
regulatory process.6 During the dozen years 1998-2009, 1 pipeline had four section 4 
rate filings, 5 had three filings, 14 had two filings and 6 had one filing – a total of about 
26 pipelines. It seems that over 100 pipelines were not involved in section 4 rate cases 
during that period. Some have not filed since 1992.7 
 
It is perhaps surprising that most pipelines have been prepared to accept the rates on file 
over a quite long period of time. Since rates are effectively fixed in nominal terms, 
inflation might be expected to reduce pipeline returns over time. Non-filing may imply 
that many pipelines have offset inflation by increased efficiency and lower costs as a 
result of increased competition and/or from the incentive effect of not having to file 
lower rates to reflect lower costs. Also, pipelines may prefer to accept lower fixed rates 
                                                 
5 FERC lists 83 rate filings over the 12 calendar years 1998-2009. 
(www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/gen-info/rate-filings) A few of these were compliance filings rather 
than proposed new rates. Wang found similar figures for the largest pipelines over the period 
1994-2000.  
6 “During the slightly over six-year period, 24 pipelines filed one general section 4 rate case, eight 
filed two, and 11 did not file any general rate case.” (Wang p. 144) There could have been other 
minor filings. “A pipeline usually files a much larger number of limited section 4 rate cases, for 
example, to change the characteristics of its services or recover specific cost items outside the 
firm’s control.” (Wang p. 144) 
7 A National Gas Supply Association (NGSA) analysis of the top 17 earning pipelines in the five 
years 2003-2007 found that one had an ongoing rate case, 8 had last filed in the previous 5 years 
and the other 8 had not filed for periods ranging from 9 to 19 years before the study date of 7 
December 2009.  
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rather than subject themselves to the intense scrutiny and possible adverse 
consequences of a section 4 rate case. 8  
 
FERC has published no general analysis of pipeline returns. Users have made some 
calculations that show a range of returns.9 Perhaps in response to such analyses and 
attendant pressures, FERC has recently brought five section 5 cases.   
 
 
5. FERC’s internal organization 
 
FERC is an independent agency whose responsibilities include the regulation of 
interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas and oil. It has up to five 
Commissioners serving 5 year terms, plus about 1350 staff organized into eleven 
Offices. Three Offices are of particular relevance here. 
 
The Office of Energy Market Regulation (OEMR), which has about 240 staff known as 
‘Advisory Staff’, “advises the Commission and processes caseload related to economic 
regulation”.  The OEMR is responsible (inter alia) for receiving a section 4 application 
and issuing a ‘suspension order’ (see below) which hands over important parts of the 
process to the other Offices. In a gas pipeline rate case this includes ordering a hearing 
and arranging for the appointment of a judge to preside over the hearing. The OEMR 
will also advise on and initiate a section 5 case following a decision of the Commission. 
 
The Office of Administrative Law Judges is charged to “Resolve contested cases as 
directed by the Commission effectively, efficiently and expeditiously, either through 
impartial hearing and decision or through negotiated settlement, ensuring that the rights 
of all parties are preserved.” This Office comprises about 15 independent 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) plus about 20 support staff. 10 
 
The Office of Administrative Litigation (OAL) is charged to “represent the public 
interest and seek to litigate or settle cases in a timely, efficient and equitable manner 
while ensuring the outcomes are consistent with Commission policy”.11 The OAL has 
                                                 
8 For earlier discussion of Order 636 and its effects, see Doane and Spulber (1994), De Vany and 
Walls (1994), Gorak and Ray (1995), Herbert and Kreil (1996), Dahl and Matson (1998) and 
Chermak (1998). 
9 The NGSA’s analysis of 32 major pipelines showed that, over the five years 2004-2008, the 
weighted average return on equity was 14.4%. 19 pipelines had an average return exceeding 12%, 
of which 5 had an average return exceeding 20%. 12 pipelines had average returns ranging from 
11.2% down to 5.9% and one had an average of - 6.0%.  
10 “Functions of the presiding judge include: Managing and presiding over hearings and 
investigations on-the-record; Issuing orders; Issuing initial decisions; Issuing reports to the 
Commission; Overseeing Discovery; Acting on motions filed in a case; Making findings of fact; 
Certifying questions to the Commission; Reviewing and certifying settlements to the Commission; 
and Summarily disposing of cases.” (www.ferc.gov) 
11 “Functions of the FERC Trial Staff include: conducting needed discovery (obtaining information 
from other parties); performing detailed analysis of data to develop testimony and exhibits; 
supporting such testimony through cross examination in hearings; preparing and presenting oral 
arguments, and conducting direct and cross examination in proceedings before ALJs; preparing 
and filing legal briefs;  
ensuring that the evidentiary record developed in each case is adequate for decision making by the 
ALJ and the Commission, while meeting all required deadlines; developing and serving on all 
parties objective settlement positions (top sheets); conducting or participating in settlement 
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about 110 staff known as ‘Trial Staff’ or ‘Litigation Staff’. A major part of this paper 
explains how Trial Staff discharge these duties in gas pipeline rate cases. 
 
The preliminary outcome of each case is either a negotiated settlement or a hearing (or 
sometimes a combination). The ALJ certifies the settlement to the Commission (see 
below) and/or issues an initial decision following a hearing. OEMR Advisory Staff 
advise Commissioners, who decide whether to approve the settlement or the initial ALJ 
decision. On any particular case, OEMR Advisory Staff and OAL Trial Staff are 
prohibited from communicating with each other.12  
 
Electricity and gas cases differ in one respect. In the case of an electricity transmission 
system, and in a few gas pipeline cases, the OEMR’s suspension order appoints an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to chair the settlement process instead of leaving this 
to Trial Staff. 13 In other respects Trial Staff perform the role as described in this paper. 
Only after the settlement process is concluded (successfully or unsuccessfully) does the 
Commission set in motion a hearing process with a (different) hearing judge.14 
 
6. Section 4 rate cases 2008 - 2009 
 
This paper illustrates FERC processes with the 12 section 4 rate cases filed in the two 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009 (i.e. from 1 October 2007 to 30 September 2009). The 
timelines are set out in Table 1. Nine of these cases were settled in full and two in part, 
and one was litigated. In three cases, aspects of FERC’s decisions are still outstanding.  
Table 2 (see later) sets out some of the main features of these cases. Briefly, 9 of the 
pipelines sought rate increases (in 4 cases partially reflecting earlier investment), 2 
sought rate decreases (partially reflecting increased volumes). In about half the cases 
the proposals also involved surcharges or tracker mechanisms, and in about half the 
cases there were also new or redefined services or changes in terms and conditions.  
                                                                                                                                              
processes with energy industry officials, state commissions, customers and other intervening 
parties; and assisting the settlement judge and parties to ensure agreements are consistent with 
Commission policy.” (ibid.) 
12 More generally, there is a degree of separation between these three Offices that is mirrored 
(sometimes to a lesser extent) in the larger US State utility regulation commissions but is not found 
in (e.g.) UK utility regulation commissions. 
13 The parties are offered a list of, say, eight available ALJs, so they can choose one whose 
experience or style they deem appropriate to the case. An ALJ acting in this capacity is referred to 
as a ‘settlement judge’, whereas acting in the other capacity is variously described as a ‘hearing 
judge’, a ‘presiding judge’ or a ‘trial judge’. A settlement judge may give views on the credibility of 
the arguments of each party, either in front of all parties, or to each party in private. With different 
styles, settlement judges make a strong effort to bring about unanimous settlements. They will not 
normally recommend acceptance of a settlement if Trial Staff object.  
14 It is not clear why FERC processes for gas and electricity differ in this way. ALJs are generally 
experienced in both sectors, but in the gas sector there are typically a greater number of parties 
with more different interests, dealing with more complex issues than in electricity. It has been 
suggested to me that specialist gas Trial Staff are more familiar with gas issues than an ALJ would 
be. Reportedly, the parties and FERC are content with the approach in each sector, and do not seek 
to change it. 
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Table 1: Timeline of Section 4 Natural Gas Pipeline Rate Cases at FERC (2008 and 2009) 
 
 
Pipeline Company Docket No. 
Rate Case  
Filing  Suspension Order 
Staff  
Top Sheet  
(assumed 
90 days) 
Settlement 
Filed 
ALJ 
Settlement Certified  
and/or initial decision  
Commission  
Approval of 
Settlement 
and/or final 
decision Present status 
     
 
   
Saltville Gas Storage RP08-257-
000 
03/04/2008 04/02/2008 (29 days) 07/01/2008 10/7/2008 (98 
days) 
10/29/2008 (22 days) 12/02/2008 (34 
days) 
Settlement, Completed 
Portland Natural Gas  
 
 
RP08-306-
000 
04/01/2008 05/01/2008 (30 days) 07/23/2008 5/11/2009 (292 
days) 
06/18/2009 part (38 
days) 
12/24/2009 rest (514 
days) 
09/23/2009 (97 
days) 
2/17/2011 (420 
days) 
Partial settlement, 
Completed 
Southern Star Central  RP08-350-
000 
04/30/2008 05/29/2008 (29 days) 08/27/2008 12/11/2008 (99 
days) 
01/13/2009 (33 days) 06/01/2009 (139 
days) 
Settlement, Completed 
El Paso Natural Gas  
 
 
RP08-426-
000 
06/30/2008 08/05/2008 (33 days) 11/03/2008 3/11/2010 (493 
days) 
04/13/2010 part (33 
days) 
01/14/2011 rest (802 
days) 
04/28/2010 (15 
days) 
(> 123 days*) 
Partial settlement 
approved, 
FERC dec’n on rest 
awaited  
Stingray Pipeline Co RP08-436-
000 
06/30/2008 07/30/2008 (30 days) 10/28/2008 3/25/2009 (148 
days) 
04/20/2009 (26 days) 06/29/2009 (70 
days) 
Settlement, Completed 
Paiute Pipeline Co RP09-406-
000 
02/27/2009 03/31/2009 (32 days) 06/29/2009 11/3/2009 (127 
days) 
11/19/2009 (16 days) 03/26/2010 (127 
days) 
Settlement, Completed 
Vector Pipeline  RP09-431-
000 
02/27/2009 03/31/2009 (32 days) 06/29/2009 10/7/2009 (100 
days) 
10/20/2009 (13 days) 12/28/2009 (69 
days) 
Settlement, Completed 
Southern Natural Gas Co.  RP09-427-
000 
03/02/2009 04/01/2009 (29 days) 06/30/2009 10/5/2009 (97 
days) 
10/20/2009 (15 days) 01/05/2010 (77 
days) 
Settlement, Completed 
High Island Offshore 
System  
RP09-487-
000 
03/31/2009 04/30/2009 (30 days) 07/29/2009 3/15/2010 (229 
days) 
04/23/2010 (39 days) 04/29/2011 (371 
days) 
(> 389 days*) 
Settlement approved, 
FERC dec’n on res’vd 
issue  awaited 
 
MoGas Pipeline RP09-791-
000 
06/30/2009 07/29/2009 (29 days) 10/27/2009 3/16/2010 (140 
days) 
03/24/2010 (8 days) 07/30/2010 (128 
days) 
Settlement, Completed 
Maritimes & NE Pipeline  RP09-809-
000 
07/01/2009 07/30/2009 (29 days) 10/28/2009 3/4/2010 (137 
days) 
03/18/2010 (4 days) 04/30/2010 (43 
days) 
Settlement, Completed 
Sea Robin Pipeline Co  RP09-995-
000 
08/31/2009 09/30/2009 (30 days) 12/29/2009 No Settlement  
 
12/13/2010 (349 days) (>155 days*) FERC decision awaited 
                         * as at 5/17/2011 
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7. Settlement Regulations 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act requires FERC to “give all interested parties 
opportunity for … offers of settlement”. Indeed, the statute gives priority to settlement 
insofar as FERC is required to hold a hearing and give a decision “to the extent that the 
parties are unable so to determine a controversy by consent”. (Walker, p. 343) 
 
The conduct of the settlement practice is governed by regulations promulgated by 
FERC itself.15 These encourage participation in formal and informal settlement 
conferences.  Failure of a party to attend a formal settlement conference will constitute 
a waiver to all objections to any order or ruling or agreement arising out of it. All 
participants attending a formal conference must be prepared to discuss the matters to be 
addressed. Informal settlement conferences are not governed by notice and participation 
requirements. In practice informal rather than formal conferences seem to be the norm. 
 
Generally speaking, the Commission tends to set rate issues for hearing and settlement 
procedures, and to set proposed changes in terms and conditions for a Technical 
Conference after which the Commission may make an order. The aim of the conference 
is to better inform Advisory Staff about operational issues prior to advising on 
Commission decisions (although some customers may use these operational issues as 
leverage in settlement negotiations, and it is also possible for settlements to include 
operational issues if the Commission has not yet issued an order). There may also be a 
Discovery Conference, either with the parties alone or including the ALJ, to set the 
parameters of discovery such as time allowed to respond to data requests. (In one case 
this determined whether the Public Service Commission was allowed to enter and 
inspect a pipeline compressor station.)  
 
The extent of discovery of information is influenced by the possibility of settlement. 
For example, under litigation procedures a pipeline might only be required to provide 
information pertaining to the specified test year. But if settlement is in prospect the 
pipeline might be asked for – and might be willing to provide - information over the 
last ten years to establish the existence or otherwise of a cyclical effect. Similarly as to 
timing: a pipeline might not be required to provide information until a Technical 
Conference is complete and a hearing judge is appointed, but it might be willing to do 
so earlier in order to facilitate the prospect of settlement. 
 
Any participant may submit an offer of settlement at any time, together with relevant 
explanatory material. This goes to all the participants, who are invited to comment 
within 20 days, with reply comments within a further 10 days.  
 
If a settlement is reached, the parties are required to provide an Explanatory 
Statement.16 If a settlement offer is uncontested (unanimous), and the explanatory 
statement does not raise issues, the ALJ ‘certifies’ it to the Commission. The 
                                                 
15 Code of Federal Regulations, Rules of Practice and Procedure, Sections 385.601-606. 
16 This addresses five questions on which the ALJ must advise the Commission, indicating whether 
the settlement raises any new policy issues or reverses the Commission’s previous stance. In 
practice the Explanatory Statement usually answers each of these questions in a brief sentence or 
two, as does the ALJ’s subsequent certification to the Commission. 
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Commission may approve an uncontested settlement upon a finding that it appears to be 
fair and reasonable and in the public interest. 
 
If a settlement is not unanimous, and is contested by any party in whole or in part, the 
Commission can “sever” the contested issues from the uncontested ones and deal with 
the uncontested ones as just mentioned. It can determine the merits of the contested 
issues “if the record contains substantial evidence on which to base a reasoned decision 
or the Commission determines there is no genuine issue of material fact”. The ALJ may 
certify a contested settlement if these conditions are met. Otherwise, the Commission 
has to take steps to receive additional evidence, typically by a litigated hearing.  
 
All communications within settlement negotiations are privileged and confidential. In 
the event that agreement is not reached and the case subsequently goes to a hearing, the 
discussions between the parties with respect to earlier offers of settlement are not 
subject to discovery or admissible in evidence. 
 
8. Procedure for section 4 rate filings 
 
A pipeline will typically initiate a section 4 case by filing a submission for a rate 
increase. (Occasionally it might request a change in rate structure, or a rate reduction, 
or even no change in rates if it has been required to file simply by virtue of a previous 
settlement obligation.) The submission includes the revised ‘tariff sheets’ and all the 
supporting documents, including the company’s relevant data on costs and cost 
allocation, volumes, depreciation rates and negative salvage (the cost of removal of 
retired plant). The submission also includes the direct testimony of all the company’s 
staff and expert witnesses (e.g. on cost of capital). FERC publishes the filing for 
comment and then schedules a hearing (see below), though in practice a case is 
typically channelled towards a settlement. 
 
Filings are substantial submissions: a smaller pipeline might file 300-400 pages, a 
larger pipeline over 1000 pages. This submission constitutes the pipeline’s case in the 
event that the request is litigated. In principle, the pipeline should be ready to defend 
the case the next day. Preparation is therefore significant, and takes 3 to 6 months. This 
includes a pre-filing meeting with Advisory Staff to check that no aspects of the filing 
will prevent it being duly processed, and pre-filing meetings with state regulators 
(almost always) and key customers (usually). 
 
9. Suspension order 
 
On receipt of a notice of filing, interested parties request permission to become 
intervenors in the process. They may at the same time file initial objections to the 
proposed rate change. These responses are public, as are all the communications and 
decisions in the case apart from settlement discussions. The number of intervenors 
varies from case to case: in the 9 sample cases that were settled the number ranged 
from 6 to over 50, with a mean of 16 and a median of 10. The number of interested 
parties is actually higher insofar as some intervenors are groups of parties.17 
                                                 
17 For example, in the Southern Natural case 18 intervenors were listed, but this included the 
Alabama Municipal Distributors Group (23 members), the East Tennessee Group of local utilities 
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FERC has 30 days to act on the submission. Typically, at the end of this period 
Advisory Staff issue a ‘suspension order’, which usually 
- summarises the company background and the requested rate change 
- accepts timely requests to intervene in the process 
- notes the objections filed by the intervenors and discusses these objections 
- finds that the proposed tariff changes raise issues that are best addressed in a 
public hearing 
- issues an order accepting the tariff change for filing but suspending it for five 
months subject to refund and conditions and the outcome of the hearing 
- orders an ALJ to be selected by the Chief ALJ, to convene a pre-hearing 
conference within 20 days in order to establish a procedural schedule, and to 
conduct further proceedings including the hearing, and 
- may reserve certain other terms and condition issues, not set for hearing, for a 
technical conference and for report by Advisory Staff. 
 
10. The procedural schedule 
 
The Chief Judge appoints an ALJ within a week of the suspension order (median 4 
days, range 1 – 6 days). The pre-hearing conference is convened about two weeks later 
(median 13 days, range 6 to 21 days).18 The parties discuss and agree a procedural 
schedule for the case, consistent with processing time standards set by the Chief Judge. 
In practice, the pipeline usually proposes a first draft of the schedule, FERC and other 
parties comment, and an agreed schedule is put to the ALJ. 
 
FERC has established three standards for cases: Simple (Track 1), Complex (Track 2) 
and Exceptionally Complex (Track 3). Gas pipeline section 4 rate cases are set on 
Track 3, which requires the hearing in 42 weeks (9 ½ months) and the ALJ’s initial 
decision in 63 weeks (about 14 months), from the ALJ’s appointment.19 These targets 
are generally met.20 They have the merit that parties know where they stand with 
respect to process – at least, up to the point where the Commission itself has to take a 
decision. There are no guidelines or targets for Commission decisions, and indeed this 
is where the durations and uncertainty are greatest. 
 
The schedule specifies about a dozen main dates in the proceeding, including dates for 
testimony, answering and rebuttal, joint statement of issues, commencement of hearing, 
briefs, and initial decision. There are also deadlines for discovery (information) requests 
and responses. In the HIOS case, the procedural schedule also made early provision for 
                                                                                                                                              
(28 members), and three other groups (Indicated Producers, Southern Cities and Southern 
Company Services Inc) with 4 or 5 members each, making a total of nearly 80 interested parties. 
18 There seems to be some inverse correlation between these two processes, so the net result is 
that the pre-hearing conference is convened about two weeks after the suspension order (median 
14 days, range 12 – 25 days). 
19 Section 5 cases are put on the faster Track 2 because refunds cannot be made until the case 
concludes. Electricity cases are usually put on the faster Track 1 or 2 because a hearing judge is 
appointed after the information discovery process and after an attempt at settlement has failed.  
20 FERC’s targets are that 75% of cases should be met within the stated times. In 2007 the 
achievement rates were 80% of Track 2 cases and 88% of Track 3 cases. There were no Track 1 
cases that year. (FERC 2010 p. 88) 
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the parties to advise the ALJ as to the status/likelihood of any settlement (about two 
weeks after the expected date of Trial Staff’s first settlement offer).  
 
The parties are always offered the facilities of a settlement judge at no charge. In 
practice they usually decline. 
 
If a settlement is achieved, the hearing is suspended. Absent a settlement, the ALJ hears 
the case, and conveys an initial decision to FERC. The parties file ‘exception briefs’ on 
this, taking exception to particular findings of fact or conclusions of law. The ALJ’s 
initial decision becomes the final decision unless FERC’s final order specifies 
otherwise. The Commission may modify elements of the ALJ’s initial decision – for 
example, to reflect a disagreement on some issue or evolving Commission policy. The 
Commission’s order, which can be extensive and not necessarily unanimous, may be 
appealed. In some cases the final order and appeal process may take years. 
 
11. FERC’s policy and role 
 
FERC’s policy has long been in favour of settlements.21 FERC has acknowledged that 
it would be unable to cope with the flow of business in their absence. Moreover, 
settlements are useful “to determine the general positions of the parties and the issues 
which may ultimately be the subject of litigation”. (Walker p. 345)  
 
OAL assembles a Trial Staff team for each case, comprising economists, finance 
experts and engineers. Typically there would be 2 attorneys, 2 supervisors (1 legal and 
1 technical), and 4 to 10 analysts (on average 6).  The team might be involved on the 
case for 5 months or more. Each member of the team might be working on two or more 
cases at the same time. If settlement is not reached, the same team stays on the case for 
the subsequent litigation. 
 
For many years FERC staff have facilitated settlements in various ways, notably by 
checking data, providing information and focusing the issues. (Spritzer p. 43) At one 
time, settlement discussions would take place only after Trial Staff and other parties 
had filed testimony in response to a company’s section 4 filing. However, to prepare 
formal testimony is time consuming and costly (and parties may get unduly wedded to 
what they have written). Since the mid-1970s Trial Staff have presented their views and 
settlement proposals to the parties before their testimony is filed. If settlement 
discussions are successful, there is no need to file testimony. 
 
12. First Settlement Offer 
 
In response to the pipeline’s filed proposal, Trial Staff’s first task is to put together “an 
objective settlement position” (often called a ‘top sheet’) which is regarded as the First 
Settlement Offer. To that end Trial Staff request extensive additional information from 
                                                 
21 “This practice increases the probability of a successful outcome where all parties’ concerns are 
addressed. … The settlement of these cases is enormously beneficial to the energy consumers as it 
dramatically limits the time, expense and resources that the Commission and outside parties would 
otherwise need to devote to these cases. Further, the resolution of a case through settlement is likely to be 
more acceptable to the parties than a litigated outcome, and therefore reduces the likelihood of an 
appeal.” (FERC 2010 p. 18) 
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the pipeline, via the discovery process. Other parties, too, are engaged in a similar 
discovery process, asking their own questions of the pipeline. It is said that this process 
frequently identifies errors in the pipeline’s calculations. Trial Staff assess the relevant 
parameters (e.g. operating expenses, investment, rate of return on equity and capital 
structure, volumes, terms and conditions, etc). They carry out a full cost of service 
review, including cost allocation, overall revenue requirement and rate design. 
 
The Settlement Offer might be around 100 pages in length including a 10-12 page 
summary. (For a smaller pipeline the total length might be around 50 pages.) The Offer 
is circulated to all participants (i.e. the pipeline and accepted intervenors); it is not 
made public, nor indeed is its despatch recorded in the Docket. 
 
The first Settlement Offer is a ‘first cut’ at the issue, usually close to what Trial Staff’s 
position would be in the event of a hearing. That is, it represents a relatively tough 
assessment of the pipeline’s filed proposal. It is generally assumed that a company’s 
filing contains an element of ‘fat’ that could be subject to challenge or bargaining. But 
the top sheet will be tailored to the specific circumstances.22 The pipeline’s section 4 
filing and Trial Staff’s first Settlement Offer then typically constitute the range within 
which negotiations proceed. However, it is necessary to take account of the views of all 
parties, some of whom might argue for an outcome outside of this range.  
 
13. First Settlement Conference 
 
The scheduled time for the submission of testimony by Trial Staff and other parties is 
about 7 months from the ALJ’s appointment (median 203 days, range 183 – 239 days). 
OAL policy is to make the first Settlement Offer 3 months (90 days) after the 
suspension order (the latter is about a week before the ALJ’s appointment). I am told 
that this target is achieved plus or minus a week or so. About two weeks are required to 
prepare testimony in the event that agreement is not reached. This means that the 
parties have about 3 - 4 months to try to reach agreement before they need to cease 
negotiations and devote themselves to preparing testimony. 
 
Trial Staff call the first Settlement Conference to explain the Offer and enable 
participants to indicate their positions. The median time from issuing the first 
Settlement Offer to holding the first Settlement Conference is 6 weeks (range 2 to 10 
weeks). The Conference, chaired by the lead attorney on the Trial Staff team, typically 
takes one day, and is held at FERC’s office in Washington DC.  
 
The Conference is attended by Trial Staff and all intervenors and their representatives, 
experts and attorneys. It is not open to the public. A small case might have about 20 
participants in the room, of which about 7 or 8 might be active. A large case might have 
up to 100 participants, of which about 60 might be active. I am told that 90% or more 
                                                 
22 For example, if the company filed an outrageous rate of return proposal, then Trial Staff might 
feel it necessary to counter it in Top Sheets with a lower rate of return proposal than they would 
normally propose. This would allow for future movement by intervenors when the pipeline lowers 
its proposal and then expects a similar offer back. Such judgements are part of Trial Staff’s 
negotiating strategy. 
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of the movement on the pipeline is typically represented directly in a case. Trial Staff 
seek to represent the interest of all parties, including those not in the room.23 
 
Participants may support or criticise the first Settlement Offer, or raise issues not 
addressed. They may be more concerned about the distribution or structure of proposed 
charges than the overall level. There may also be trade-offs between different aspects of 
the proposal, and indeed between the overall rate and the terms and conditions.24  
 
At this Conference there is a full exchange of views. The aim is that by the end of the 
day the pipeline should be aware of all issues and views. All parties take notes, but 
there is no formal record. 
 
14. Second Settlement Conference 
 
The pipeline responds by means of a counter-offer, perhaps the next day, perhaps in a 
couple of weeks, but mostly within a week. A second Settlement Conference is then 
held (median 3 weeks after the first Conference, range 1 to 21 weeks), and usually set 
for two days. During this period Trial Staff and perhaps others will formulate, propose 
and discuss various counter-offers. 
 
Trial Staff’s aim now is to try to get agreement among the various parties. Some parties 
may have contacted Trial Staff even before the first Settlement Offer, to provide 
information or views. Trial Staff prefer to formulate their first Offer without too much 
interaction. After that they are open to interaction with all parties. They will start 
contacting the parties before the second Conference, by phone or email, discussing 
what to focus on, what to take into account. 
 
At the beginning of the second Settlement Conference, Trial Staff will usually ask the 
pipeline to leave the meeting while they explain their thinking to the other parties. They 
will then seek to integrate the views of other parties into a single agreed second Counter 
Offer. This process takes between one and four hours, typically about two hours.  
 
With the pipeline back in the room, Trial Staff will present this second Counter Offer to 
the pipeline, explain their thinking, and indicate to what extent this Offer is supported 
by the other parties. There is then a break while the pipeline considers the second 
Counter Offer and the views expressed. The pipeline will then usually come back with 
its own Counter-Offer. Depending on how close the parties are to agreement, it may be 
decided to continue discussions that day, or to set another conference. 
 
                                                 
23 ‘Not all customers intervene in the proceedings. That is part of the reason that OAL exists. We 
represent the public interest, and part of that interest is the parties who are silent in the 
proceedings. Ensuring the final rate is just and reasonable is not only for the customers who 
participate in the proceedings, but for all customers of the pipeline.’ Personal communication 26 
August 2010. 
24 For example, some customers may want a low rate from A to B, others from C to D. Some 
customers may be concerned about the rate for storage, others interested only in transmission 
charges. A pipeline might argue the need to reduce the daily ‘out-of-balance’ allowance from 5% to 
4%, and the customers might indicate a willingness to accept that if the overall rate were slightly 
lower, which might be achieved by shaving a point off the allowed rate of return. 
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In contrast to the early proposals, these later offers may be just a couple of pages, 
focusing on the key points of difference where concessions are being made. Stay-out 
and come-back provisions (see below) may be mooted in the later proposals, but it is 
not worth raising them until agreement seems likely. 
 
15. Reaching agreement 
 
In many cases (6 out of 9 in the recent sample) agreement in principle was reached by 
the end of the second Settlement Conference. In one case, a third Settlement 
Conference was required, and in two cases a fourth. In the sample of 9 cases, the 
median time to reach agreement (i.e. from the assumed time of Staff’s first Settlement 
Offer to the date of the last Settlement Conference) was about 11 weeks. In 8 cases the 
range was about 5 to 14 weeks, within which the median time of the ‘core’ negotiating 
period (from the first to last Settlement Conference) was about 4 weeks (range about 1 
to 9 weeks). In the ninth case (HIOS, see below) negotiation was broken off while 
testimony took place, and the total time was 27 weeks. 
 
It takes time to understand and mesh the different interests of the different parties 
including different customers, not just to reconcile the interests of customers versus 
pipeline. To this end, the pipeline will typically arrange separate meetings with those 
groups of customers that are particularly affected by its proposals. In some cases the 
pipeline might agree to specific requests from specific customers that do not involve 
OAL or any other party. 25 
 
Trial Staff are proactive in these settlement discussions. For example, they may suggest 
to a party that it develop a memo on a particular issue so that others can properly 
understand it, or so that Staff can indicate the extent of their support or indicate respects 
in which the Commission would be unlikely to support the argument. Or Staff might 
indicate some respect in which a proposal is inconsistent with FERC procedure but 
could perhaps be reformulated so as to be consistent. Throughout the process, Staff will 
be indicating their availability to meet and discuss and help to bring about agreement. 
 
Once agreement in principle is reached, the pipeline or the parties jointly file a motion 
to suspend the procedural schedule.26   In a few cases, time may begin to run out before 
the scheduled time for filing testimony. If there are still reasonably good prospects for 
achieving a settlement, Trial Staff might ask for postponement of the hearing process 
by one or two months. (There were no cases of this kind in the sample.) In practice, in 
almost all such cases, settlements are achieved within the additional period. If there are 
not good prospects for achieving a settlement - or if a pipeline wishes to assess the 
                                                 
25 Such deals do not mean discrimination or covert practices: all rates have to be set out in the 
settlement agreement. Moreover, in the course of business, any customer-specific discounts from 
published rates have to be publicly notified on the pipeline’s website. The customer-specific deals 
negotiated during settlement might relate to operational issues that do not affect other parties (e.g. 
access to a particular service or a modification to a contract), and might not even be subject to 
FERC jurisdiction. 
26 They explain to the ALJ that it is preferable to avoid spending additional time on discovery, 
collecting evidence and preparing testimony, and incurring additional litigation costs, when this 
output may well not be needed. Instead, the parties could better focus their efforts on preparation 
and drafting of settlement and related documents. The ALJ normally accepts this request. 
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strength of the evidence to be filed by FERC and other parties before committing to a 
settlement - the process reverts to the previously determined hearing schedule.27  
 
16. Filing the settlement document 
 
If agreement is reached in principle, the pipeline drafts a Settlement Document, of some 
15 to 40 pages. This sets out the agreed rates, and other backup information to the 
extent needed to explain how the settlement came about (for example, on cost of 
service or volumes assumed). In addition, there would be detailed schedules (about 2 to 
20 pages) containing rate sheets, and specification of terms and conditions. There might 
also be moratorium (‘stay out’) and ‘come back’ provisions (see below).  
 
This draft Settlement Document is circulated to all parties. In the past, it was customary 
to arrange a Settlement Drafting Conference in Washington DC to discuss the details of 
the wording. This can still happen but has now fallen out of favour since it is easier for 
participants to email comments. A revised draft Document is circulated, for discussion 
and agreement at an all-party telephone conference. If there is a Settlement Drafting 
Conference, very occasionally it is held in the pipeline’s region, so as to get more 
participation from local experts and operators, and so that they can hear first hand the 
thinking behind the settlement. 
 
The ALJ invites the parties to draft the ALJ’s letter of certification to the Commission. 
They do this according to a fairly standard template. The agreed settlement is then filed 
with the ALJ and published. In the sample, from agreement in principle at the last 
Settlement Conference to publication of the settlement document takes a median six 
weeks (range 3 to 13 weeks).  
  
17. Comments and FERC decision 
 
In principle, there are then two rounds of published comments, for parties to indicate 
their acceptance or rejection of the settlement, and to respond to other comments.  5 
days might be allowed for the first round, 3 to 5 days for the second. In practice, most 
settlements are unanimous, in which case there are few comments, all supportive, and 
no replies are needed. The ALJ then certifies the settlement as unanimous (or contested 
or partial) and refers it to the Commission. In the present sample, the median time from 
filing a full uncontested settlement to certification is between a week and a month 
(range 4 to 33 days). Certification of a partial or contested settlement, or one with a 
reserved issue (see below), takes about five weeks (range 33 to 39 days). 
 
In the absence of further complications, the total time to reach a unanimous settlement 
and obtain certification is usually under six months from the time of Trial Staff’s first 
Settlement Offer.  In the present sample, excluding the HIOS case with a reserved 
issue, the median is about 5 months (range from 3½ to 6 months). The median 
Commission time to approve it was about 2½ months (range 1 to 4 ½ months) from 
certification. In contrast, the HIOS case with a reserved issue took 9 months from first 
settlement offer to certification, and another year to get Commission approval. 
 
                                                 
27 This happened in the HIOS case. The parties resumed discussions after filing testimony, and 
reached agreement just before the hearing was due to start. 
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18. Black box proposals 
 
A main element in most rate cases is the total revenue associated with the proposed 
rates. Initially, the discussions of the parties centre upon the calculations used in the 
traditional cost of service approach, and the different values of the parameters proposed 
by the pipeline, Trial Staff and others. When the parties are close to agreement it may 
be possible for the parties simply to agree to ‘split the difference’ on these parameters. 
 
In some cases, certain parameters may be contentious, particularly the cost of capital 
(or return on equity) and traffic volumes. The parties may not wish to be seen to be 
taking particular positions or conceding ground on such parameters. Moreover, if such 
parameters are specified in a settlement then subsequent observed performance may 
provide a basis for FERC to investigate the situation. In some cases, the parties handle 
this by not including the details of the calculations in the Settlement Document; they 
include only the agreed rates, and perhaps some general guidelines. 28  
 
In other cases, one or other party might at some stage propose a ‘black box’ settlement, 
whereby the ‘bottom line’ rates or revenue are specified but without linking them to 
particular assumptions. Other parties can then assess this proposal by making their own 
preferred assumptions about the parameter values and comparing the resulting rates or 
revenue with the proposed settlement. These parties may counter with black box 
proposals of their own.  
 
To the outsider, and indeed to FERC personnel not part of that Trial Staff team, almost 
all settlements may appear to be black box insofar as the Settlement Document gives no 
details of the calculations. However, settlements where the parameters are agreed but 
not made public are not ‘true’ black boxes to those involved in the negotiations. Indeed, 
even ‘true’ black boxes are the result of a series of earlier proposals that start from Staff 
cost of service calculations and begin to narrow down the differences between the 
parties. (By the same token, lack of transparency is not a major issue in practice since 
any party with an interest in the case and a concern about information can become an 
intervenor and get access to all the information disclosed in the course of negotiations.) 
 
It is said that ‘true’ black box approaches happen about one third of the time, and are 
initiated about equally by pipelines and customers. Of the sample 11 full or partial 
settlements, 1 gave a complete build-up of rates, 4 said they had used a black box 
approach (i.e. a ‘true’ black box), and 6 gave little or no detail of the calculations 
underlying the settlement.29 The latter approach nonetheless indicates a cost of service 
approach, albeit without giving details of the calculations, because a ‘true’ black box 
approach would have been declared in the settlement document.  
 
19. An example of the negotiation process 
 
To illustrate the negotiation process, the following recent example refers to a small 
interstate pipeline with no storage facilities and essentially only one service offering. 
                                                 
28 For example, one of the 9 sample cases specified a pre-tax rate of return but not the capital 
structure or return on equity. 
29 In Portland Natural Gas, short term rates were nost of service approach was in principle 
applicable 
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On 29 June the pipeline filed for a rate increase, citing a need to invest significantly for 
reliability purposes and to meet safety requirements. It also noted higher operating 
expenses and a lower throughput since its last rate filing. It showed a projected total 
cost of service of $5.4m and a billing determinant (volume of gas transmitted) of 1.52m 
Dth [Dekatherm], to yield a requested rate of $3.55 per Dth per month. (The allowed 
rate is the total cost of service divided by the billing determinant.) There were few 
intervenors: a distribution company and some state public utility commissions. 
 
On 30 July FERC issued its suspension order, suggesting that a number of issues might 
be explored at the hearing, including (1) the appropriateness of the proposed cost 
allocation and rate design (2) the level of the overall revenue requirement (3) the 
appropriateness of the proposed 11.50 percent return on equity and capital structure (4) 
the level of the depreciation rates and (5) the billing determinants. 
 
A settlement conference was scheduled for 6 October, when Trial Staff issued their Top 
Sheet calculation with total cost of service $4.0m and volume 2.01m Dth leading to a 
rate of $1.98. On the same day (exceptionally) intervenors independently made their 
own proposal assuming a total cost of service of $3.5m and the same volume of 2.01m, 
implying a rate of $1.76. Trial Staff and intervenors assumed broadly historic levels of 
investment and rate base, operation and maintenance expenses, depreciation expense 
and volume whereas the pipeline was projecting greater future investment, higher rate 
base and O&M expenses, faster depreciation and lower future volume. The pipeline 
argued for 8.81% (overall) rate of return, Trial Staff for 8.19% and intervenors for 
8.01%. In broad terms, intervenors were arguing for one third higher volume, one third 
lower cost of service, and a consequent rate that was half the level that the pipeline 
proposed. The main difference on cost between the parties related to the regulatory rate 
base (reflecting the amount of new investment) and the allowed rate of return thereon. 
 
The parties agreed to exchange information and to meet for a second settlement 
conference on 4 November, before which the pipeline would circulate a revised 
proposal. On 3 November the pipeline offered a significantly smaller increase in new 
investment, some reduction in the other cost items and a slightly modified return of 
8.58%, hence a total cost of service of $4.9m, some 10% less than before. It assumed a 
5% higher volume at 1.60m. The combination implied a rate of $3.05, some 14% lower 
than before.  
 
At the settlement conference, intervenors revised their own offer, now basically 
accepting the pipeline’s investment plan. They also moved towards the pipeline on 
other cost items, but (surprisingly) suggested an even lower rate of return at 7.99%. 
Nonetheless the proposed total cost of service of $4.3m was some 21% higher than 
their previous offer. Since the initial rate filing, the pipeline had signed a new contract 
with a user, and this evidence enabled the intervenors to accept a volume of 1.62m, 
essentially equal to the pipeline’s revised assumption, which was a 20% reduction in 
volume from the intervenors’ initial (historical) position. These assumptions implied a 
rate of $2.65, an increase of about 50% on the intervenors’ first proposal. 
 
At this point, the difference in rate between the pipeline and intervenors had reduced 
from $1.80 to $0.41 – that is, from about 65% (of a midpoint) to about 15%. The parties 
then decided to focus on the bottom line rather than to debate particular cost items. 
During the day there followed three ‘black box’ offers and counter-offers, culminating 
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in agreement in principle to a rate of $2.80. The parties also agreed a billing 
determinant (volume) of 1.60m, as per the company’s second proposal, and a cost of 
service of $4.47m.30 Compared to their second offers, this represented a concession of 
about 8% by the company and 6% by the intervenors: in other words, it roughly split 
the remaining difference between them. The parties agreed to circulate a draft 
settlement agreement on 10 November and the pipeline agreed to file an offer of 
settlement on or about 30 November. 
 
20. Non-unanimous or contested settlements 
 
As noted, settlements do not have to be unanimous. If contesting parties or contested 
issues are “severable”, then the Commission may sever (carve out) and approve the 
uncontested portions. If there is unanimous agreement, a settlement is likely to say that 
it must be taken as a whole, and that any modification to it would render it null and 
void. But if it is not unanimous, or if there is likely to be sustained opposition to the 
settlement or parts of it, the language often allows the Commission to sever particular 
parties or issues. The consenting parties agree to be bound by the settlement, and to pay 
the rates in the settlement.  The non-consenting parties then go to hearing, which will 
determine the outcome for them, and which may be better or worse than the outcome 
that the contesting parties have agreed under the settlement. Meanwhile the non-
consenting parties pay the higher rates in the section 4 proposal. 
 
Are non-unanimous settlements likely to be frequent? A utility will normally try to 
ensure that Trial Staff and state regulatory commissions are on board with a settlement. 
Occasionally a large user might feel sufficiently aggrieved and willing to bear the 
burden of objecting to an otherwise unanimous settlement. However, the uncertainty 
about the outcome and the cost and burden of carrying a case alone make non-
unanimous settlements unattractive to dissenting parties. (Trial Staff is likely to make 
this point in the course of negotiations. In those US State commissions whose rules do 
not permit severability, individual complainants have greater ‘hold out’ power.)   
 
The evidence suggests that non-unanimous settlements are indeed abnormal. They do 
occur, as in the recent case of Florida Gas Transmission Company (Docket RP10-21). 
One customer, Infinite Energy, objected to “only one non-essential component of the 
Settlement”. Trial Staff and other parties argued that Infinite Energy’s opposition to the 
Settlement was without merit, and that acting favourably on its comments might well 
destroy all of the substantial benefits of the settlement. The ALJ found that the 
objection did not raise any genuine issues of material fact, and certified the contested 
settlement. In the light of this initial decision, which meant that Infinite Energy would 
have had to carry the case on its own, Infinite Energy withdrew its opposition and the 
Commission approved the now-unanimous settlement.  
 
Non-unanimous settlements can be problematic for Trial Staff. Neither the settlement 
itself nor arguments raised in the course of negotiations may be used in evidence in a 
subsequent hearing. If a non-unanimous settlement goes to a hearing, Trial Staff may 
                                                 
30 FERC requires a settlement to specify the rate and also depreciation rates. In this case the 
negotiation process had led to agreement on depreciation rates. The parties had also come to 
agreement on volume and total cost, and specified these in the settlement, which is not always the 
case. 
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find themselves in a difficult position. Although they would prefer not to get involved, 
they wish to protect the interests of those who have accepted a settlement in line with 
their own recommendations, and indeed to protect the public interest. For example, 
suppose that the pipeline’s original filing involved an implausibly high cost of capital, 
but the dissenting party’s case involved an unrealistically low cost of capital. In the 
absence of further testimony, the Commission would be forced to choose one or other 
of these inappropriate values. Trial Staff might therefore feel obliged to provide 
testimony for a more reasonable value, in order to give the Commission that option.  
 
21. Partial settlement and reserved issues 
 
Partial settlements, where the parties agree on some issues and leave other issues for the 
Commission to decide at a hearing, are possible but again not common. This is not 
surprising: parties would need to feel that they are comfortable with the settled issues 
regardless of what the Commission might decide on the unsettled issues, even if its 
judgement is quite unexpected. It is not often that parties feel this.  
 
Two cases from 2008 and 2009 are nonetheless recent examples of partial settlement.  
After a year’s discussion and initial testimony, the parties in Portland Natural Gas were 
able to agree rates for certain short-term services but left the bulk of the issues for 
hearing. After many negotiations, the parties in El Paso Natural Gas (EPNG) were 
eventually able to agree all but four issues.  
 
Sometimes the parties find that deferring a difficult issue, leaving room for the parties 
to pursue their own causes later, helps to provide a way through. In the same El Paso 
case, the parties could not agree whether to continue with a ‘postage stamp’ rate design 
for fuel reimbursement or to change to a mileage-based approach. The settlement had a 
moratorium on section 4 and 5 filings but explicitly provided that the users could file a 
complaint against the postage stamp design if they wished.31 
 
As an alternative to a contested or partial settlement, parties may affirm that they have 
reached a settlement that should be sent to the Commission as uncontested, but they 
wish to reserve particular issues for the Commission to clarify or modify. They 
indicate, usually via a clause in the settlement, that they will accept the Commission’s 
ruling on these reserved issues without the need for further evidence via a hearing.  For 
example, in the HIOS case, the parties agreed that the settlement was uncontested but 
requested the Commission to decide on the applicability of a controversial storm 
damage repair surcharge. 
 
In all three cases, the Commission’s resolution of the non-settled issues is running into 
years rather than months.32 
 
22. Why settle? 
 
                                                 
31 One shipper has recently done so. Texas Gas Service Company, Docket RP10-951. 
32 El Paso initial decision 514 days, final decision 420 days, total time 2 ½ years; Portland Natural 
Gas initial decision 802 days, final decision still outstanding; HIOS final decision on reserved issue 
still outstanding after a year. 
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Why do parties settle rather than go to hearing? Some reasons are associated with 
process. Settlement is evidently quicker and less expensive than litigation and hearing. 
Admittedly it still takes time and cost to analyse a rate case and participate in the 
negotiating process. However, settlement saves on the cost of preparing and presenting 
testimony, cross-examination and subsequent briefs to the Commission. It means that 
company and customer management can get back sooner to the task of managing their 
businesses and Commission staff can move on to the next case.  
 
Settlement reduces uncertainty about the outcome. The risks of litigation can be 
substantial. For example, when the parties are far apart on allowed Return on Equity 
(ROE), there is a real possibility that the ALJ would come down largely in favour of the 
other side, and/or that the Commission might adjust the ALJ’s initial decision in an 
adverse way. To illustrate, in the recent SFPP oil pipeline case (Docket, the pipeline 
proposed 7.64% ROE, with which the other parties and the ALJ were content. In 
contrast, in the recent Portland Natural Gas (PNG) case in the present sample, the 
pipeline proposed 14.75%, the shippers 10.88%, CAPP 10.81% and Trial Staff 11.39%; 
the ALJ decided on 11.65%. The initial decisions by the ALJs were both in December 
2009, and in both cases the Commission gave its final decision on the same day, 17 
February 2011. The Commission decided to leave SFPP’s allowed ROE at 7.64% 
despite subsequent increases in market yields, whereas it decided to increase PNG’s 
allowed ROE from 11.65% to 12.99%. Settlement could have avoided or at least 
reduced this risk exposure (which in the event worked to the disadvantage of PNG’s 
customers). 
 
Settlement brings sooner rate relief to customers. The pipeline files for a rate increase 
which is implemented after six months subject to refund. The outcome – whether of a 
settlement or a litigated process - is typically a lower than requested rate increase and 
hence a refund, but a settlement brings the refund more quickly. Although this 
represents a corresponding downside to a pipeline, there is limited advantage in holding 
on to excess revenues that will soon have to be refunded (although rate filings to 
address a temporary liquidity problem are not unknown). Early reduction of risk is 
important to investors. In addition, pipeline management can better determine its 
investment and dividend policy once its allowed revenues are determined, and can 
refine its marketing policy once the prices of its services are determined. 
 
The other set of reasons for agreeing settlements is that they enable the parties to secure 
preferred outcomes that they legally could not, or likely would not, achieve under a 
litigated hearing process. This raises the question whether settlements make a 
difference, and if so in what respects settlement outcomes are different from litigated 
outcomes? Given that either side can decline to settle and revert to a litigated outcome, 
it is not to be expected that settlements would lead to systematically higher or lower 
prices and returns on investment. However, there are other respects in which 
settlements make a difference, as described in the next two sections. 
 
23. Stay Out (moratorium) and Come Back provisions 
 
Settlements provide assurance for pipeline and for customers, not least about their 
ability to continue to operate on the agreed terms. Some settlements therefore 
incorporate a Stay Out or moratorium provision. Typically, this provides that the 
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pipeline may not initiate a section 4 request for a change of rate, and/or customers may 
not initiate a section 5 request for a rate investigation, during the settlement period. 
 
In the present sample, 6 of the 11 full or partial settlements provided for a moratorium 
on both section 4 and section 5 requests (4 for 3 years and 2 for 5 years). One provided 
for a moratorium only on section 4 requests (for 3 years). 4 made no such provisions.33 
 
Since 1992, pipelines have not been required to file rate applications every 3 years. 
This suited the pipelines as long as costs were not rising but did not necessarily protect 
customers if costs were falling. Trial Staff take the view that it is appropriate to enable 
all parties to re-examine market conditions on a regular basis to ensure that the rate 
design remains appropriate. Consequently, Trial Staff always put in their first 
Settlement Offer a ‘come back’ provision or time limit, with an obligation on the 
pipeline to refile its rates, usually after 3 years.  
 
The inclusion and duration of a come back period are subject to negotiation. One view 
is that pipelines initially objected to a comeback period, but have since ‘learned to live 
with it’. Another view is that pipelines are willing to agree a comeback provision – but 
only at a price in terms of a few basis points on the allowed rate of return. Either side 
might want a longer period for the certainty or protection it provides. However, the 
pipeline would argue for a shorter period if it expected soon to incur significant 
expenses that would constitute a legitimate basis for a rate increase. Similarly, 
customers would argue for a shorter period if they expected costs to reduce. (In the US 
rates are set and reset on the basis of actually incurred expenses, rather than projected 
future expenses as in the UK.)  
 
Of the 11 sample settlements, all but 2 had come-back provisions. 2 had a come back 
provision after 3 years, one specified a minimum of 1 ½ years and a maximum of 4 ½ 
years, one had 4 years, and 4 had 5 years. One had an obligation to file a cost and 
revenue study within 5 years. Thus, although 3 years seems to be a preferred duration 
for the agreement and moratorium on rates, a somewhat longer period of about 5 years 
is more usually allowed before the pipeline must refile. 
 
24. Differences in other settlement terms 
 
In addition to Stay Out and Come Back provisions, settlements enable other outcomes 
that could not or would not have occurred via litigation. As noted, an earlier El Paso 
settlement provided for a cap on the rates in certain contracts for the entire life of those 
contracts. El Paso’s 2010 settlement established three Working Groups to explore the 
possibility for mutual agreement on additional tariff and rate issues. Gas Transmission 
Northwest’s 2007 settlement (Docket RP06-407) provided for PG&E to split its very 
large contract with the pipeline into three separate contracts of different durations, 
which in due course enabled PG&E to transfer part of its business to the new Ruby 
pipeline, thereby facilitating competition. 
 
                                                 
33 In some jurisdictions, there have been disputes over the implementation of agreements, and 
requests to reopen them. This has not been the case at FERC. A settlement is a legal and binding 
document. It is very rare to see challenges to its enforcement or requests for it to be reopened. 
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Settlements provide flexibility on amortisation. FERC’s standard practice might 
amortise a particular type of asset over (say) a 10 year life. It would be open to a 
settlement to agree that the asset would be amortized over (say) 5 or 15 years, and to 
specify the profile of that amortisation. This would have implications for the time path 
of rates and revenues. 
 
Settlements provide flexibility on refunds too. Suppose a pipeline had an authorised 
rate of $1.00, filed to increase it to $1.20 and a hearing later determined that the 
appropriate rate was only $0.80. FERC could order a refund of revenues flowing from a 
rate in excess of the previously authorised rate of $1.00. However, it would be open to a 
settlement to agree that the pipeline would refund revenues in excess of a rate of, say, 
$0.95 (presumably in return for some concession by customers). In addition, a preferred 
date of refunding can be agreed. 
 
Arrangements to spread risks and rewards associated with uncertain future demand 
have been developed in settlements, which could not form part of litigated decisions. 
Mojave’s 2007 settlement included a mechanism for sharing with customers any 
revenues received above a specified level. Maritimes’ 2010 settlement credits 50% of 
annual interruptible revenues above $9m pro rata to firm customers. Great Lakes’ 2010 
settlement shares with qualifying shippers 50% of the revenue in excess of $500m 
received over two years. 
 
Settlements have included arrangements at variance with litigated decisions. Granite 
State, envisaging a series of future investments, recently proposed a capital cost 
surcharge that would track its capital costs and thereby obviate the need for several 
expensive and time-consuming section 4 rate cases over the next few years. It noted 
that the Commission had accepted capital cost trackers for other pipelines and said that 
it had modelled its own proposal on those. The Commission vetoed this, commenting 
that it had previously held that such costs should not be included in such surcharges, 
and that the tariff provisions mentioned by the pipeline “were approved as the result of 
settlements in those proceedings which do not establish Commission policy”.34  
 
Sometimes, parties may find a settlement attractive because it avoids the need to set 
precedents. The black box settlement has already been mentioned, where the parties do 
not commit to particular numerical calculations or indeed to particular lines of 
argument. Similarly, parties may construct a settlement to avoid the need for the 
Commission to set a precedent with respect to particular parameters or policies.   
 
25. Information and relations in the industry 
 
                                                 
34 Granite State requested a rehearing of this decision, pointing out the inconsistency of Commission 
policy. “The Commission has utterly failed to explain how a cost tracker or surcharge can be fair, 
reasonable, and in the public interest to warrant approval in a settlement agreement, but so unjust and 
unreasonable that it warrants outright rejection when presented directly in a rate case filing. On the one 
hand, the Commission states that such cost trackers are against the Commission’s policies and 
regulations, while on the other hand, the Commission states that it will approve capital cost trackers if the 
parties agree to them during settlement proceedings.” Granite State Gas Transmission, Inc. Docket RP10-
896, Request for rehearing, 23 August 2010. Subsequently, Granite State agreed a settlement that did not 
include a capital cost tracker, and withdrew its requested rehearing. 
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In Canada and some other US jurisdictions, regulators, companies and other parties 
have noted that negotiated settlements have generally led to better information flows 
and understanding in the industry, and to better relations between companies and 
customers. This may be an additional reason to settle. At FERC, too, it seems to be 
acknowledged that relationships are better with settlements than if litigation were the 
norm. Settlement processes provide a significant opportunity for customers to explain 
the nature of their business requirements and concerns to the pipelines and transmission 
companies, and at a time when these utilities are ‘in listening mode’. Utilities, too, want 
their customers to understand their own positions. There are full and frank discussions, 
that are not possible in a formal hearing, and that may not be achieved during normal 
business activities because of the pressure of other issues. As noted, the issues 
discussed and on which agreement can be sought and reached are not limited to major 
headline issues of price. They can include all manner of detailed operational issues on 
which individual customers may have been seeking satisfaction for some time. This is 
not, of course, to claim that all relationships are good, as discussed below. 
 
26. Which cases settle? 
 
A thorough analysis of which cases settle and why would necessitate a much larger 
sample than the present 12 cases, including econometric analysis with time series and 
cross-section data over several jurisdictions. Nevertheless some insights can be 
obtained that might inform further research. Table 2 lists various potentially relevant 
characteristics. 
 
Is settlement influenced by size of pipeline? Although some small pipelines are easier 
to deal with and some are harder, in general smaller pipelines have less complex issues 
and there is less revenue at stake. The 3 small (Non-Major) pipelines did indeed all 
settle in full without qualification. But some of the medium (Major), large (Top 30) and 
Mega (Top 16) pipelines did and others did not, so size is not the only factor. 
 
Does pipeline size affect speed of settlement? The smaller pipelines have less complex 
issues. However, they may not have the staff and expertise to deal with FERC 
procedures, and may expect or necessitate more attention. Of the 8 cases that settled in 
full without a reserved issue, the average time to settle was 122 days for the 2 large and 
Mega pipelines, 143 days for the 3 medium ones and 137 days for the 3 small pipelines. 
This suggests that the professionalism and experience of the larger pipelines may be a 
more important factor in speed of settlement, even though their issues are typically 
more complex than those faced by other pipelines. 
 
What about transactions costs? Table 2 indicates the number of protesting parties (i.e. 
filing formal arguments against the pipeline) and other intervenors (registering an 
interest in the case), and where available the number of signatories to the settlement. 
Number of parties is clearly not a main determinant of speed. A case with 43 parties 
and 227 signatories settled in the least time and the one case that failed to settle had 
only 6 parties. 
 
Table 2 attempts to classify the cases in terms of complexity of the issues based on an 
informed qualitative assessment of the range of services at issue, the extent of 
differences between the parties, and the difficulty of the issues raised. Settlement might 
be easier with a relatively transparent and acceptable cost that has actually been 
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Table 2: Characteristics of Section 4 Natural Gas Pipeline Rate Cases at FERC (2008 and 2009) 
 
Pipeline Company 
Previous rate 
determination 
Pipeline
Location 
 
Pipeline 
Capacity 
Proposed 
Annual 
Cost of 
Service 
Number of 
protestors, 
intervenors, 
signatories Main Issues 
Susp.        
Order 
Pages  
Proposal 
Complexity 
Pipeline 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
Ranking 
Moratorium? 
years, s4, s5 
ComeBack? 
years 
Calculation of 
rates 
Outcome 
Settlement 
time 
Saltville Gas Storage 
 
 
 
First filing E Non-
major  
$29m 2, 9, na Rate increase 
(investment), 
Fuel tracker 
1 Simple  N/a M 3 s4 s5 
CB 5  
No detail Settlement  
120 days  
Portland Natural Gas 
 
 
 
Settlement 2003  
+ Comeback 
NE Major  $69m 5, 15, 5 Rate increase 
Short-term rates 
1 Average Problematic 
during process 
M 5 s4 s5 N/a Partial 
settlement 330 
days 
Southern Star Central 
 
 
 
 
Settlement 2005 MW Top 30  $257m 10, 20, na  Rate increase 
(investment) 
New  mechanisms 
Changed T&C 
3 Average 3 CB 5 Full detail Settlement  
132 days 
El Paso Natural Gas  
 
 
 
 
Settlement 2007 SW Mega  $650m 25, 54, 36 Rate increase 
New services 
Changed T&C 
Article 11.2 
6 + TC Complex 32 M 3 s4 s5 
CB 3 
Blackbox Partial 
settlement 526 
days  
Stingray Pipeline Co. 
 
 
Settlement 2002 Gulf Major  $20m 1, 3, 4 Rate increase 
Event surcharge 
2 Simple/Ave N/a CB 3 Blackbox Settlement  
174 days 
Paiute Pipeline Co. 
 
 
Settlement 2005  
+ Comeback 
W Non-
major  
$35m 3, 6, na Rate increase 1 Simple N/a CB 1 ½ - 4 ½  Little detail Settlement  
143 days 
Vector Pipeline  
 
 
Settlement 2004 
+ Comeback 
MW Major  $115m 1, 10, na Rate decrease 1 Simple/Ave 29 M 5 s4  Blackbox Settlement 
113 days 
Southern Natural Gas  
 
 
 
 
Settlement 2005  
+ Comeback 
SE Mega  $631m 18, 43, 227 Rate increase 
(investment) 
New mechanisms 
Changed T&C 
3 + TC Average 5 M 3 s4 s5 
CB 4 
No detail Settlement 
112 days 
High Island Offshore 
System  
 
 
Settlement 2007 Gulf Major  $58m 4, 11, 8 Rate increase 
Hurricane damage 
Revised rate defns 
2 Simple/Ave Problematic 
during 
process? 
M 3 s4 s5 
CB 5 
Blackbox Settlement+ 
Res. Issue 
268 days 
MoGas Pipeline 
 
 
 
Merger Order 
2007 
+ Comeback 
MW Non-
major  
$17m 3, 5, na Rate increase 
(merger,investment) 
1 Simple N/a M 3 s4 s5 
C&R 5 
No detail Settlement 
148 days 
Maritimes & NE  Settlement 2006 
+ Expansion 
Comeback 
NE Major  $?  8, 24, 21 Rate decrease 
(expansion) 
Fuel Retainage 
Quantity/gas quality 
1 ½ +TC Simple N/a CB 5 No detail Settlement 
141 days 
Sea Robin Pipeline Co  Settlement 2009 Gulf Major  $18m 5, 6, --  Hurricane surcharge 1 ½  Simple, Novel N/a N/a N/a  No Settlement 
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incurred, like a maintenance expense or a replacement pipe, than with a less transparent cost like the 
cost of capital, or a new investment where some parties might query the benefits to them of that 
investment. The Table also notes the number of pages devoted to summarising the issues in the 
suspension order. The 6 cases classed as Simple (with at most 24 other parties and 2 pages of 
summary) all settled in full, albeit in one case reserving an issue for the Commission. Of the 5 
Average cases, 3 settled in full. The single Complex case (with 53 other parties and 6 pages of 
summary) part-settled. This suggests that simplicity facilitates settlement and that complexity hinders 
it.  
 
On the other hand, it is also said that some issues lend themselves to litigation and decision by lay 
Commissioners whereas other more technical issues don’t, so the parties prefer to settle the latter. 
This may simply mean that the parties make a more determined effort to settle such issues than they 
otherwise might. Or, more intriguingly, it might mean that, after a certain point, an increase in 
complexity means a greater rather than lesser likelihood of an issue being settled, because leaving 
such cases to the Commission is too awful to contemplate. Put more technically, is the probability of 
settlement monotonically decreasing or U-shaped as a function of complexity? 
 
A comparison of the settled and non-settled issues in part-settled cases might throw light on this. The 
two part-settlements in the present sample do not suggest an easy answer. For example, the parties in 
Portland settled short-term rates but not long-term rates, whereas the parties in El Paso did the 
opposite. In Portland, the pipeline claimed they had settled “one of the most contentious areas of 
dispute in the case”, whereas in El Paso the parties failed to resolve “perhaps the most difficult and 
complex aspect of the Stipulation”.35 36Some therefore argue that settlement of complex issues 
depends on the specific circumstances of each pipeline and its customers, and each case is different. 
 
Is settlement dependent on the pipeline’s attitude? Reportedly, some pipelines have excellent 
relations with customers and look to build longer-term relationships; others do not and are said to 
prefer to gouge out the last dollar of profit. It is said that this reflects the management style of the 
pipeline, rather than other factors such as the extent of competition. Table 2 shows the ranking of the 
larger pipelines by their customers (in a table of 43 interstate pipelines).37 Two high-ranking 
pipelines settled quickly, but so did a lower-ranking pipeline.  
 
One related suggestion is that practice reflects a cultural difference, with Midwestern pipelines 
tending to settle and pipelines serving the east and west coast tending not to. Table 2 shows that the 3 
Midwestern pipelines did indeed settle in full. However, there are not sufficient observations from 
                                                 
35 This aspect related to Article 11.2 of the 1996 settlement, which had been left unresolved by the 2006 
settlement, and in the present negotiations “the parties were unable to fully resolve the myriad issues relating to 
[it]”, so they were now sending it for litigation to achieve some finality.   
36 This aspect required interpretation of Article 11.2 of a previous 1996 settlement, which capped rates for certain 
existing contracts beyond the ten year term of that settlement. The question was whether that provision still 
applied (as the customers claimed) or whether circumstances had changed (as the pipeline claimed). The 2006 
settlement did not resolve this question. In the present negotiations “the parties were unable to fully resolve the 
myriad issues relating to [it]”, so “to achieve some finality” the parties agreed to litigate it. The ALJ’s initial 
decision on 14 January 2011 held that the provision did still apply. The parties have challenged various aspects of 
this decision. The Commission has yet to issue its final order. 
37 Customer Satisfaction Index, Interstate Pipelines, Mastio & Company, Natural Gas Transportation Customer Value 
Study, 15th Edition 2011. (For discussion, see Erin Nelson, “Customer relationships keep pipelines focused in difficult 
market” Pipeline and Gas Journal, Vol 237 No. 12, December 2010, at 
http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.com/customer-relationships-keep-pipelines-focused-difficult-market) 
This Index defines a Mega pipeline as at least 3,500 miles, serving at least 3 states and delivering at least 1 trillion 
cubic feet. There are 16 Mega pipelines in its Index. 
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other regions to provide a basis for distinguishing between the 5 other pipelines that settled in full 
and the 4 that did not. 
 
Some suggest that pipeline attitude can be over-emphasised: all pipelines, however hard-hearted, 
have an interest in earlier and secure revenue flows. They suggest that personalities among the other 
parties must be considered too. Active leadership amongst these parties, enabling them to find 
common ground and see the utility’s point of view, is also important. Although Trial Staff play this 
role, this view would say that Trial Staff cannot or do not play that role particularly well, although 
‘collegiality’ – many participants being ‘alumni’ of FERC – does facilitate negotiation. This is an 
interesting idea, but it is difficult to identify personalities and leadership empirically. 
 
Consider the characteristics of the 4 cases that did not settle in full and without qualification. El Paso 
that settled only in part is a large pipeline with complex issues of rate design and many different 
customers in different locations, hence with conflicting interests to reconcile, and not so highly 
thought of by its customers. Sea Robin that did not settle is a simple pipeline with no complex 
problems, the difficulty here being a proposed hurricane tracker provision for which precedent was 
disputed. HIOS which settled but reserved an issue for the Commission, and Portland Natural Gas 
which settled only in part, are both simple pipelines with a normal range of issues. They are not 
ranked in the Satisfaction Indexes but Portland’s customers were noticeably aggrieved. 38 Reportedly 
there were tensions with HIOS customers too.  
 
The messages of this limited sample seem to be that a) small pipelines and simple issues typically 
settle, b) medium and large pipelines with averagely complex issues can also settle, c) novel issues 
and very complex issues involving conflicts between many customer groups are an obstacle to 
settlement, but also d) customer relationships and pipeline attitude to customer satisfaction seem 
relevant.  
 
27. Trend over time? 
 
The limited observations noted in the introduction to this paper suggest that settlements have become 
more frequent at FERC, from just over half the cases in the 1960s to around 90% now. Why is this? 
Again, this properly requires a more extensive time-series and cross-section analysis. Factors 
commonly mentioned include the following. 
 
- During the 1970s high inflation rates led to many more rate cases being filed, often 
requesting high rate increases that were difficult for customers to accept. In subsequent times 
of low inflation the fewer and more moderate requested rate increases were more amenable to 
settlement.  
- FERC policy in favour of settlements reportedly strengthened in the late 1970s. (As noted, it 
was no longer deemed necessary for Trial Staff to file testimony before commencing 
settlement negotiations.)39 The industry, too, reportedly saw settlement as a ‘win-win’ 
approach. 
                                                 
38 For example, Portland Natural Gas Shippers Group were “surprised that Portland submitted the filing without 
providing for any advance public notice whatsoever, despite Portland’s claims to the contrary”. There are subsequent 
references to “disruption and prejudice”, “pursuing discovery from PNGTS has been unusually burdensome and 
difficult”, “simply no basis for unfair and unsupported assertion by counsel for PNGTS” etc. Perhaps to make amends, 
Portland’s motion to approve the settlement explicitly recognizes the “constructive approach” of its customers. 
39 However, FERC decisions in the late 1980s raised questions about contested settlements. (Walker 1986, Drom 
1991) 
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- FERC Order 636 of 1992, which removed the obligation to file rate cases every three years, 
seems to have reduced the number of rate cases to about one sixth of the previous level. It 
also simplified the cases, which now relate primarily to base rates reflecting the pipeline’s 
own costs, not to the price of gas.  
 
In the absence of a required filing every three years, come-back provisions may have been a 
significant factor in bringing rate cases in recent years. Of the 12 cases here, six reflect come-back 
provisions.40 A previous settlement seems likely to pre-dispose the parties to a further settlement but 
it is difficult to test this proposition since in all but two of the cases the rates previously obtaining 
were set by a previous settlement. 
 
Settlements seem generally able to deal with cases where precedent has been established. When 
conditions are relatively stable, learning over time implies an increasing proportion of settlements. 
Changing conditions and innovation could disrupt this. In recent years the range of issues and 
instruments may have been increasing, but evidently not yet sufficiently to offset the trend towards 
more settlements.41 
 
Is FERC unique, and if so why? FERC Staff seem more proactive than most US State commissions – 
too proactive in the view of some parties. Nonetheless my impression – in the absence of explicit 
published accounts and data – is that settlements are more welcome at most US State commissions 
than they used to be. Some say budget pressures are a factor, since resources have not increased to 
cope with the more frequent and often annual filings associated with pass-through factors and 
‘riders’. Less inflationary conditions may have been a factor too. Settlement before State 
commissions may now be more common than litigated outcomes, but not close to the FERC figure of 
80-90%. A conjectured explanation for this difference is that rate increases at State level are more 
immediate and significant in terms of final customers, and hence more political, than at FERC, which 
deals only with interstate rates that typically form a smaller proportion of prices to final customers. 
In consequence, customer representatives before the State commissions – and indeed the State 
commissions themselves - need to be seen to be scrutinising and challenging rate increases, not 
simply agreeing them with the utilities. 
 
28. Pre-settlements 
 
If the parties normally find it possible and attractive to negotiate settlements of rate proposals filed 
by pipelines, would it not be possible to do this before rather than after the pipelines file the rate 
proposals? This would avoid the cost and uncertainty of filing and defending the case, and would 
also reduce the total time involved. It would not necessitate the involvement of FERC Trial Staff, 
and is in fact encouraged by FERC.42 
                                                 
40 In one case this was contingent on a new investment rather than the previous settlement reaching maturity, in 
another case it was embodied in a Commission merger decision rather than in a settlement. 
41 Referees have suggested other factors possibly influencing settlement. DC legal counsel could have an interest 
in lengthy litigation rather than settlement, but presumably have a greater interest in a satisfied client. FERC 
advisory and trial staff and ALJs are not rewarded differentially for settling or litigating cases. FERC presumably 
has an interest in avoiding the resource problems that would occur if settlement were to decline significantly. 
There is no reason to believe that ALJs or Commissioners treat companies differently depending upon whether 
they have settled since failure to do so may have been attributable to other parties. There is no obvious reason 
why any of these factors would have changed over time. 
42 “The Commission commends Dominion, PSCNY and the other parties in this proceeding for meeting with one another 
and negotiating their differences before making any filing with the Commission. This has enabled the quick processing of 
a rate reduction that benefits all of Dominion’s customers, without the expense of a hearing and lengthy litigation. The 
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Against this, it is said that other parties are reluctant: customers are suspicious of the pipelines, so 
that even if a rate reduction is proposed they are wary of giving something else away; the typically 
divergent interests in a rate case mean that each customer is fearful of not getting an appropriate 
outcome relative to other customers; and parties generally prefer to see what Trial Staff say in their 
first Settlement Offer before committing themselves.  
 
Occasionally, however, pipelines do indeed file ‘pre-settlements’ before, or in lieu of, section 4 or 
section 5 proceedings. Wang lists two such cases in the six-year period 1994-2000. The main 
difficulty seemed to be getting all actual and potential customers on board. In 1995 the pre-
settlement by Transwestern (RP95-271) was contested, but the Commission nonetheless approved it, 
noting that one of the few contesting parties was not in fact a current customer. In 1999 the 
Commission welcomed the settlement negotiated by Kern River with its firm customers, but 
withheld approval because “negotiations must include all those who have an interest in the outcome 
of those negotiations”.43 Kern River later reached an accommodation that enabled the objector 
Sempra to consent to the settlement. 
 
In 2005, Dominion negotiated a settlement rather than face a section 5 investigation (see below), and 
in 2006 Colorado agreed a settlement to obviate the need for a section 4 rate filing. For several years 
there were no further pre-filing settlements. However, despite the perceived difficulties, there were 
four pre-filing settlements in the middle of 2010, and two more in Spring 2011. (Table 3)  
 
What factors are conducive to pre-settlement? Are they easier to achieve for smaller lines with fewer 
participants, offering fewer services with simpler issues? Pine Needle is indeed at the smaller end of 
the spectrum in terms of complexity, customer numbers and revenue.44 Trailblazer, Mojave, Venice 
and Carolina are all medium pipelines with a dozen or fewer signatories. But the four earlier pre-
settlements (Transwestern, Kern River, Dominion and Colorado) are all by large (Top 30) pipelines. 
Thus, pipeline size, and any associated transactions costs, do not seem critical factors. 
 
Staff are not involved in these pre-settlements so there is no summary of the company background 
and proposals issues as there is with section 4 and 5 rate cases. It is therefore not generally 
straightforward to assess the complexity of the issues involved. Pipeline ranking in terms of 
customer satisfaction is very varied. However, one feature is surely significant. All of the ten pre-
filed settlements followed a previous settlement (or even pre-settlement), six of which embodied a 
come back clause. Pre-settlement is thus more likely where the pipeline has previous experience of 
settlements. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission encourages other pipelines to act in a similar manner.” (Dominion Transmission Inc, Docket RP05-267, 
Commission approval, 27 May 2005) 
43 Kern River had not negotiated with Sempra, an interruptible and replacement shipper, which argued that it was 
adversely affected by the proposed settlement. After referring the matter to its Dispute Resolution Service, 
without success, the Commission approved the settlement as it applied to the consenting parties, and severed 
Sempra from the settlement, giving it an opportunity to litigate the sole issue of rate design as it applied to 
Sempra. On 30 January 2001 the ALJ held that Kern River’s ‘postage stamp rate design’ was unjust and 
unreasonable for Sempra, and that Sempra’s proposed zoned-based rate design was appropriate to be applied to 
Sempra. RP99-274-003, Initial Decision, January 30, 2001. 
44 Pineneedle is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage facility built in 1999, with a Customer Group comprising 4 
parties plus North Carolina Utilities Commission, and annual revenue of $14.65m. 
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Table 3 Pre-filing settlements 
 
Pipeline 
Company Docket 
Filed 
Approved 
Location 
Served 
Pipeline 
Capacity 
Number 
of 
parties 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
Ranking 
Previous rate 
determination 
ranswestern  
RP95-
271 
2 May 
1995 
27 July W Top 30 10 - 20 31 Settlement 1994 
Kern River 
RP99-
274 
31 March 
1999 
9 Feb 
2000 W Top 30 22 1 
Settlement 1995  
+ Comeback 
Dominion 
Transmission  
RP05-
267 
1 April 
2005  
27 May NE Mega 26 12 Settlement 2001 
Colorado 
Interstate Gas  
RP06-
397 
 20 June 
2006  
7 August Central Top 30 7 17 
Settlement 2002  
+ Comeback 
Trailblazer  
RP10-
492 
12 Mar  
2010 
30 April MW Major 8 37 
Settlement 2004  
+ Comeback 
Mojave Pipeline  
RP10-
1082 
16 Aug 
2010   
28 Oct W Major 7 N/a 
Settlement 2007 
+ Comeback 
Venice 
Gathering 
System  
RP10-
1280 
3 Sept 
2010  
15 Oct Gulf Major 11 N/a Settlement 2001 
Pine Needle 
RP10-
1284 
9 Sept 
2010  
Mar 30 
2011 SE Non-major 5 N/a 
Settlement 2007  
+ Comeback 
Carolina Gas  
RP11-
2076 
April 29 
2011 
Awaited SE Major 12  7 Settlement 2006 
Colorado 
Interstate Gas 
RP11-
2107 
12 May 
2011 
Awaited  Central Top 30 16 17 
Pre-Settlement 
2006 + Comeback 
 
 
29. Settlement of Section 5 cases 
 
Section 5 cases are where FERC or another party initiates an investigation with a view to securing 
reductions in potentially excessive rates, typically as indicated by the financial and operating 
information filed annually in Form 2. Regulatory bodies are generally reluctant to bear the burden of 
challenging existing rates. (Joskow 1974) Until recently FERC had reportedly not brought a section 
5 case for several decades. Nevertheless, from time to time such cases happen. Would a pipeline 
would be willing to negotiate a rate decrease rather than go to hearing?  
 
Consistent with experience in Florida (Littlechild 2009a), the evidence shows that it would. When 
the Public Service Commission of New York (PSCNY) notified Dominion in fall 2004 of its 
intention to file a section 5 complaint, Dominion and PSCNY negotiated a rate reduction in early 
2005.45 
   
                                                 
45 Docket RP05-267, FERC Order approving uncontested settlement, 27 May 2005, p. 2. Dominion lists no less than 
78 customers (representing at least 85% of Dominion’s annual revenue) as signatories to the pre-filed settlement. 
The settlement incorporated limited amendment to previous settlements, leaving in place the settled resolution of 
a series of complex issues on Dominion’s system. It nonetheless involved a $49m reduction in Dominion’s annual 
revenues, totalling $245m over the 5 years of the settlement. 
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Dominion commented that the outcome showed that the Commission’s existing methods of rate 
regulation worked effectively. PSCNY and two of the parties took issue with that claim. FERC 
subsequently responded to the debate, and to suggestions that some pipeline returns were 
unreasonably high and needed examining. In March 2008 its Order 710 required gas pipelines to 
report more detailed financial information. On the basis of that information, FERC concluded that 
three pipelines – Natural, Northern (both Mega) and Great Lakes - ‘may be substantially over-
recovering their cost of service, causing their existing rates to be unjust and unreasonable’.46 
 
In each case the pipeline had previously reached a settlement, but the settlement period had expired 
some years ago and there was no comeback provision. On 19 November 2009 FERC issued section 5 
orders. As with section 4 cases, Trial Staff reviewed the information and put forward an initial 
settlement offer. Two of the pipelines proposed settlements that were accepted or not opposed by 
customers (74 settling parties in the case of Natural) and were supported by Trial Staff.47  
 
Settlement discussions also took place with Northern. However, on 5 May 2010 the Northern 
Customer Group, consisting of seven of the largest shippers that held a majority of capacity on the 
pipeline, put forward a motion to terminate the section 5 proceeding, subject to Northern agreeing to 
an 18 month moratorium on proposing a section 4 rate increase.48 Several additional parties 
supported the Customer Group, including several state public utility commissions. Trial Staff and 
some other shippers were opposed. The Commission ordered the termination of the section 5 case, 
with the Chairman dissenting. Interestingly, Northern has one of the best customer satisfaction 
rankings among all pipelines, the other two being average. The outcome was in effect stimulated by a 
settlement, although not of a conventional kind. 
 
A year later, FERC ordered investigations of two more pipelines.49 Again, they had previously 
reached settlement but without a comeback provision. Within six months, both had filed settlements, 
though not without some further controversy in one case. 50 
 
30. Concluding remarks 
 
                                                 
46 Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America LLC, Docket RP10-147; Northern Natural Gas Company, Docket RP10-
148; Great Lakes Gas Transmission Limited Partnership, Docket RP10-149. These three pipelines are ranked 12th, 
1st and 19th, respectively, in order of size, and 1st, 10th and 5th, respectively, in NGSA’s analysis of average 
profitability. They are ranked 24th, 2nd and 20th, respectively, in terms of customer satisfaction. 
47 The rate reductions implemented were less than implied by FERC’s initial calculations, and less substantial than 
first appeared. The bargaining power of the users was limited by the downturn in the economy, which had led to 
reduced volumes that might have justified an increase rather than reduction in rates if the matter had gone to 
hearing. 
48 Docket RP10-148, Motion of Northern Customer Group to terminate section 5 proceeding and request for 
shortened comment period, 5 May 2010. The Commission had estimated an over-recovery of $167m for 2008, but 
Northern claimed that it under-recovered by about $63m in 2009. Northern projected increases in its cost of 
service and decreases in revenue from a sharp reduction in shipper demand, and informed its shippers that it 
intended to file a section 4 proceeding for a rate increase that would supercede the section 5 proceeding and also 
shift the risk of cost under recovery to the customers. Trial Staff submitted a settlement proposal that most parties 
supported but Northern rejected. 
49 Kinder Morgan Interstate Gas Transmission LLC Docket RP11-1494 and Ozark Gas Transmission, L.L.C. Docket 
RP11-1495, FERC press release 18 November 2010. Kinder Morgan is ranked 2nd in NGSA’s analysis of profitability 
and 40th in the Customer Satisfaction Index. Ozark is not in either list. 
50 Kansas Corporation Commission was critical of the process (“FERC Trial Staff aggressively pursues hasty 
settlements”) and of the pipeline’s refusal to allow state commissions to participate in its proposed workshops on 
future tariff proposals. Docket RP11-1494, Initial Comments, May 10, 2011. 
EPRG No     1105                                                                                                               
32 
FERC encourages negotiated settlements, and explains that it could not regulate without them. It 
observes that the use of settlements better addresses all parties’ concerns, dramatically limits the 
time, expense and resources devoted to these cases, and provides an outcome more acceptable to the 
parties.  
 
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The parties involved have increasingly preferred settlement 
to litigation over the course of the last half-century. This is a remarkable record of survival in an 
activity – utility regulation – that has been characterised by no little reform and change over this 
period. Indeed, settlement is now actively chosen by all parties – utility, customers, interstate and 
state regulators – in some 90% of all section 4 rate cases. Recently, pipelines are choosing settlement 
as a means of reducing rates, in preference to resisting section 5 cases. Traditional litigation has 
become essentially a method of dispute resolution limited to novel or exceptionally difficult rate case 
issues. 
 
A factor in this evolution has been the pro-active role taken by FERC Trial Staff and settlement 
judges. Trial Staff indicate their thinking on the key parameters as a basis for informed discussion by 
the parties. Thereafter, the regulatory aim is to bring the parties into agreement, not to impose a 
preconceived settlement upon them.  Having given a lead, FERC seeks to facilitate the market 
process, not to replace it. 
 
Nevertheless other factors are undoubtedly relevant. Further and more systematic research is needed 
to better understand what they are, and to compare outcomes over time and in different jurisdictions. 
A potentially significant development in the last couple of years is the pre-filing settlement, achieved 
without the aid of Trial Staff. Does this suggest that FERC’s active process is not in fact instrumental 
in facilitating settlements? Or is pre-settlement a mark of the change in attitude that FERC’s active 
process has helped to bring about?  
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